In a recent article, there is a telling quote, reflecting some of the failure in Iraq, and a new principle to try and avoid the problem in the future.  See the quote below: "We will never go to war again unless we go as a whole government,"
 
This sounds a bit like when General Creighton Abrams declared that we would 'never go to war again without the National Guard,' as an effort to commit America's communities to the war effort.
 
The new quote implies that the State Department, and other agencies will be committed to deploying their employees to the theater of operations, and "in country" as a part of all future wars.
 
I wonder how that will sit with all those armchair bound bureaucrats at State, who recently decried and otherwise protested a recent decision to involuntarily deploy State Department folks to Iraq?
 
Things just keep getting cursiouser and curiouser.
 
Regards
Randy Givens
 
 
"In a nod to the new emphasis on cultural awareness in contemporary war fighting, particularly in combating insurgencies, one of the most interesting things revealed during the call is the formation of what is being called the "Theater Military Advisory Assistance Group" (TMAG), which LTG Caldwell described as a group of experts that will assist commanders on the ground to better understand the local culture in the theater in which they're deployed. As it currently stands, the TMAG program is staffed by 106 uniformed military personnel, but the ultimate goal is -- of course -- to bring civilian experts into the mix. "We will never go to war again unless we go as a whole government," Caldwell said. The program is being designed to be more proactive than reactive -- Caldwell said that "our intent is to be engaged early on, versus being reactive after the fact so we can establish those relationships and ongoing dialog."
 

In a conference call with bloggers Feb. 26, the Army outlined the newest version of its Field Manual (FM 3-0 Army Operations), the first revision of Army doctrine since 2001. According to LTG William Caldwell IV, Commander of the Combined Arms Center, the manual has finally taken the step of elevating stabilization operations to the level of offensive and defensive ops.

An Executive Summary was passed out beforehand that outlines the chapters of the manual, which goes like this:

-- Chapter 1 establishes the context of land operations in terms of a global environment of persistent conflict, the operational environment, and unified action. It discusses the Army's expeditionary and campaign capabilities while emphasizing that it is soldiers who accomplish missions.

-- Chapter 2 describes a spectrum of conflict extending from stable peace to general war. From that spectrum, it establishes five operational themes into which various joint operations fit. Borrowing heavily from emerging NATO doctrine, this chapter helps Army leaders to understand where diverse operations such as peacekeeping and counterinsurgency fit and shape supporting doctrine.

-- Chapter 3 is the most important chapter in the book; describing the Army's operational concept -- full spectrum operations. Full spectrum operations seize, retain, and exploit the initiative through combinations of four elements: offense, defense, and stability or civil support operations. Mission command is the preferred method of exercising battle command.

-- Chapter 4 addresses combat power, the means by which Army forces conduct full spectrum operations. It replaces the older battlefield operating systems ("BOS") and elements of combat power with six warfighting functions tied together by leadership and employing information. Combined arms and mutual support are the payoff.

-- Chapter 5 reviews the principles of command and control and how they affect the operations process -- plan, prepare, execute, and assess. The emphasis is on commanders and the central role that they have in battle command. Commanders understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and continually assess.

-- Chapter 6 discusses operational art, offering Army commanders a bridge between military theory and practice.

-- Chapter 7 is about information superiority, particularly information operations. Information operations divide into five Army information tasks, with particular emphasis on information engagement.

-- Chapter 8 addresses the significance of strategic and operational reach to the force, articulating how the Army capitalizes on unique expeditionary and campaign qualities to promptly deploy forces into any operational environment worldwide, even the most austere regions.

In a nod to the new emphasis on cultural awareness in contemporary war fighting, particularly in combating insurgencies, one of the most interesting things revealed during the call is the formation of what is being called the "Theater Military Advisory Assistance Group" (TMAG), which LTG Caldwell described as a group of experts that will assist commanders on the ground to better understand the local culture in the theater in which they're deployed. As it currently stands, the TMAG program is staffed by 106 uniformed military personnel, but the ultimate goal is -- of course -- to bring civilian experts into the mix. "We will never go to war again unless we go as a whole government," Caldwell said. The program is being designed to be more proactive than reactive -- Caldwell said that "our intent is to be engaged early on, versus being reactive after the fact so we can establish those relationships and ongoing dialog."

Not a lot was said on the technology front -- there were some references to information operations and the "modular force," but expect lots more on this once FM 3-0 is released on Thursday.